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Robert Trypuz (1979) graduated in Philosophy (specialization in Logic) at the Catholic University of Lublin in 2003. He is a Ph.D. student in Computer Science at the University of Trento and a researcher in Laboratory for Applied Ontology (LOA). His scientific interests include: Formal Ontology of Action and Agency, Philosophy of Action, Logic of Action and Agency, Ontology of Organization, Intentionality. Email: trypuz@www.loa-cnr.it Phone: (office) +39 0461 314844 (cell phone) +39 328 0528916 Skype: |
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The Degree Dissertation (SUMMARY)The title of my MA thesis is: The Logic of Norms of Georges Kalinowski and Georg Henrik von Wright. These two authors mentioned above are the precursors of the new branch of philosophical logic - namely - normative (or deontic) logic. In the year 1951 they constructed (irrespective of each other) the pioneers logical calculi, which can formalize some normative reasoning. Until today many deontic logics have been constructed. Their formal aspects are interesting, though there has emerged the need for something more. The Normative Logics need some metalogical consideration and the answer to the very important question 'Is there any practical usefulness of such logical calculi'. The First Normative Logics were constructed with intention of using them in ethic, law and many other normative fields and disciplines. Kalinowski and von Wright started constructing the normative logics from the extensive analyses of linguistic structure of norms, different kind of norms, ontological status of norms, etc. I have noticed that these subsequent research were devoid of such important analyzes and were based on the vague and hazy intuition. Therefore, I concentrated myself on authors who were pioneers and continued my research into normative logics. The sources, ontological assumptions and, obviously, the issue of practical application of these systems seemed to be important for me.Normative (deontic) logics are the study of the logical relationships among propositions (normative sentences) that assert that certain actions or states of affairs are obligatory, permissible, forbidden or indifferent. In my thesis I have compared approaches to constructing logic of norms of both authors: Kalinowski and von Wright. There have been shown two sources of their logics of norms. First of them is specific interpretation some logical calculus such as: propositional, modal and tree-value logics. The second aspects were: the ways one deduce norm with another in law and ethic, the linguistic structures, ontological status and views of the truth-value of norms. There have been carried out the discussion on the logical calculi which had existed before origin normative logics and which were basis of these logics. I managed to show that von Wright had utilized some modification of one's modal logic (the system M). However, Kalinowski has taken J. Lukasiewicz's tree-value and modal logics. Thanks to the discovery of analogy between alethic and deontic (normative) modalities it became possible to use the modal logics in order to formalize normative discourse (see: G. H. von Wright. An Essay in Modal Logic. Amsterdam 1951. pp. 2):
Besides,there were considered different type of norms such as moral (axiological) norms and regulations (the law of state, prescriptions), categorical and hypothetical norms. The moral norms can be treated as the specific type of norms, which order, permit or forbid somebody to do something for the sake of some value (good or evil). The prescriptions are the specific type of norms which order, permit or forbid somebody to do something because their have been made by somebody or an institution. A norm is the categorical one if there is the condition, which must be satisfied in order a norm could 'work'. Hypothetical norms are in force regardless of conditions. The normative logic of Kalinowski is the logic of the moral (axiological) and the categorical norm. The deontic logics of von Wright are the logics of prescriptions, conditional and hypothetical norms. I have proved the mentioned authors had had to answer the question if norms can function as premises or conclusions in logical inferences. According to definition of logical inference, the parts of its may be only sentences (in indicative mood) which are true or false. It is clear that someone who wants to use norms in such type of inferences has two solutions. Firstly, he accepts that norms may be true (or false) or second he doesn't accept that norms may be true (or false) and then he has to make some modification of norms. Secondly, in order to use the logical inference, changes each of norms N into normative sentences: 'N exists' or 'N exists for the sake of set of norms'. The normative sentences are sentences in the indicative mood and thereby are true or false. Furthermore there were taken up the issues concerning ontological and epistemological problems of the normative discourse. Especially I tried to answer to following questions: 'what is norm?' and 'what does it mean that norms are true (false)?' It has been pointed out that norm is a sense of normative sentence. In other words, the normative sentence means norms. On the other hand, the normative sentence denotes specific kind relation, normative relation, occurs between a person, namely agent, and an action. The normative relations are: 'obligatory', 'permittion', 'prohibition', etc. With this point of view the norm is true if and only if there is factual normative relation between agent and action. For example, the norm: 'John ought to pay the taxies' is true if and only if there is the obligation between John and action 'payment the taxies'. Moreover, I made the terminological distinction between 'normative logic' and 'deontic logic'. The logic, which accepts that norms are the true and false propositions, can be named the Normative Logic. Otherwise the logic, which reject that norms are true and false propositions, we name Deontic Logic. In the last two chapters my thesis there were reported and analyzed some normative calculi of von Wright - such as: 'Old System' (OS), 'New System' (NS), 'Deontic Logic of Categorical Norms', 'Deontic Logic of Hypothetical Norms' - and Kalinowski - such as: K1 and K2 . There were proofed that the system K1 of Kalinowski is part of the system OS of von Wright. It follows that the system K1 is formally weaker form the system OS. |
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